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BEYOND ACCOMMODATION:
RECONSTRUCTING THE INSANITY
DEFENSE TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE




Victorian psychologist Dr. Henry Maudsley wrote in 1892 when
questioning why mothers kill their children: "[a] mother, worn down
by anxiety and ill-health," can become "very low-spirited and de-
sponding" and "imagin[ing] perhaps that her soul is lost, or that her
family are coming to poverty," might "one day, in a paroxysm of de-
spair, kill[] her children in order to save them from misery on earth,
or because she is so miserable that she knows not what she does."1
On the morning of June 20, 2001 Andrea Pia Yates was feeding
her children cereal for breakfast when her husband Rusty left for
work in Clearwater, Texas.2 However, the morning was hardly typi-
cal, as Yates drowned her five children in the family bathtub and then
calmly called the police and her husband to tell them that something
was wrong with the children.3 As she drank a Diet Coke, Yates told
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2003.
HENRY MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE 187 (5th ed. 1892). See gener-
ally Trevor Howard Turner, Henry Maudsley, in THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY:
MISSING PERSONS 453-54 (C.S. Nicholls ed., 1993). Dr. Maudsley was well known for his
lunacy work in England. He published many articles on mental health and was well known
for his lectures. Id. at 453. He also was the joint editor of the Journal of Mental Science
from 1863 to 1878. Id. In 1907, Maudsley contributed 30,000 pounds to establish a hospital
to treat early mental illness, which resulted in the 1914 foundation of the Maudsley hospital
(that still exists today). Id.
2 Transcript of Andrea Yates's Police Interview (June 20, 2001), Hous. CHRON., Feb. 22,
2002 at A 34.
3 Timothy Roche, The Yates Odyssey: Andrea Yates Wanted Lots of Kids and a Solid
Family Life but Lost It All One Murderous Morning. As Her Trial Begins, the Defense Will
Try to Prove She is Insane. But that Begs the Question: Could the Tragedy Have Been
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police officers who arrived at her house that her children were not
"developing correctly" and that she had "not been a good mother to
them."4 Perhaps, as Dr. Maudsley phrased it, Yates had become "so
miserable that she knows not what she does,"5 as is suggested from
Yates' substantial mental illness history.' Since 1999, Yates had
been hospitalized four times, attempted suicide twice, and her doctor
for a time had prescribed Haldol, a medication designed to control
hallucinations and other psychotic symptoms.7
The media onslaught surrounding the Yates case is typical of
American press coverage involving mothers who kill their children.'
Unlike almost any other criminal defendants, mothers who murder
their children evoke sympathy, confusion, and abhorrence.9 Society
is torn between wanting to protect the helpless child and recognizing
that perhaps the very act of child murder suggests that the mother was
severely ill or demented and therefore deserving of sympathetic sen-
tencing.' ° In modem American society, childcare and other house-
hold tasks, still remain ultimately the woman's responsibility."
Thus, when mothers kill children, the women's typical role as child
nurturers and primary child care givers is contradicted and chal-
Averted?, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 44, 50. On June 20, Andrea "called 911 and then her hus-
band," Rusty. Id. She told her husband, "It's time. I finally did it," and hung up the phone
asking him to come home. Id. Rusty Yates called back to ask Andrea what was wrong and
she told him that, "It's the kids." Id. When Rusty asked which one, Andrea replied all five.
Id.
4 Id. at 50; see also Brad Hunter, Devil' Drove Mom to Murder, N.Y. POST, Jan. 21,
2002, at 9.
5 MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 187.
6 See Anne Belli Gesalman, Signs of a Family Feud: The Trial ofAndrea Yates Tests the
Insanity Defense as Relatives Try to Cope with an 'Unspeakable' Crime, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
21, 2002, at 41, 41. Yates had a history of severe emotional distress, postpartum depression
and postpartum psychosis. Id.
7 Id. Yates also believed she was possessed by the devil. Roche, supra note 3, at 50.
After she was arrested, she told doctors that she wanted her head shaved with the numbers
666 across her scalp. Id. at 50. Since her arrest, however, she has been put back onto Haldol
and other the antipsychotic drugs, and has told her husband Rusty Yates that, "It's like a fog
being lifted." Id.
8 See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern Ameri-
can Infanticide, 34 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1996).
9 Id.
'o Oberman points out that there is great ambivalence in American society and other cul-
tures as to how to punish infanticide offenders and that "[r]egardless of whether one is in-
clined for or against sympathy for women who kill their children, there are dangers inherent
in this unarticulated impulse to exceptionalize infanticide." Id. at 49.
11 ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 3-4 (1989).
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lenged.12 Societal ambivalence towards mothers who kill is reflected
in the disparate sentencing of maternal infanticide offenders, ranging
from the death penalty to more lenient sentences of one to two years
in prison. 3
A number of other countries have passed infanticide statutes that
mandate consideration of a woman's mental state in infant murder
cases that occur within a year after a woman gave birth. 4 But
American courts have not adopted similar statutes.15 In all states,
mothers who kill their children are prosecuted under homicide stat-
utes. 6 Many researchers have pointed out the inconsistency in the
American courts in responding to infanticides, and some have sug-
gested statutory reform similar to those statutes adopted in other
countries. 7 In the United States, courts continue to evaluate postpar-
tum depression defenses and other mental illnesses under the existing
insanity defense. 8 The prevailing insanity defense test 9 applied
across United States jurisdictions is extremely narrow and makes
proving legal insanity exceptionally difficult for even the most se-
verely postpartum psychotic women.2" Therefore, the Yates case is
most significant because it demonstrates the pressing need for insan-
12 See generally VERTA TAYLOR, ROCK-A-BY-BABY: FEMINISM SELF-HELP AND
POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION (1996).
'3 See, e.g., State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (seventeen-year-old
Hopfer was sentenced to fifteen years to life for placing her newborn infant in a trashcan);
Laura Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Infanticide,
38 UCLA L. REv. 699, 700-02 (1991) (citing Nancy Zeldis, Post-Partum Psychosis-A Rare
Insanity Defense, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1-2, col. 3) (pediatric nurse Ann Green
was acquitted by reason of insanity in 1988 of two counts of second degree murder and one
count of attempted murder for suffocating two of her infants and attempting to kill the third).
14 See Oberman, supra note 8, at 18 (provides list of countries that have infanticide stat-
utes); England, for example, enacted an infanticide statute in 1922 and 1938 that automati-
cally reduces the charge from murder to manslaughter if a woman kills a child within a year
of birth. See id at 15; infra note 150.
" Diane Jennings, Accused Mother's Defenses Limited: Mental State Tough to Show in
Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2001 at IA.
16 Oberman, supra note 8, at 20.
17 ANIA WILCZYNSKI, CHILD HOMICIDE 163 (1997).
18 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
(1994).
19 See infra notes 167-229 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of the insanity
defense test implemented in the United States).
20 See, for example, CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL
THEIR CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM
MOM" 70-72 (2001), for a general discussion of why the existing insanity defense test is dif-
ficult for some postpartum psychotic women to meet.
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ity defense reform to address the realities of postpartum psychosis
and other mental illnesses.21
Most state jurisdictions currently use a version of the narrow
M'Naghten insanity test22 developed under English common law in
1843 to assess whether defendants have met the burden of establish-
ing a complete insanity defense to murder.2 3 Despite extensive criti-
cism of the M'Naghten test and state attempts at reform, most states
reverted back to a narrow insanity defense in the aftermath of John
Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal for reason of insanity after he attempted to
assassinate President Ronald Reagan.24
Some scholars have suggested that a statutory remedy is neces-
sary to address the unique circumstances typically surrounding infan-
ticide crimes. 2' However, a gender-specific, carve-out exception to
promote consistent sentencing of infanticide offenders is unnecessary
and could potentially perpetuate inequality for women.26 A statutory
remedy in infanticide cases would generalize female offenders based
upon assumed mental incapacity after childbirth and would ignore re-
21 Assessing the application of the insanity defense to all mentally ill defendants is be-
yond the scope of this article. This article focuses specifically on the application of the in-
sanity defense to postpartum psychotic women. For a general discussion of the insanity de-
fenses' inadequate application to all, see Sally Villareal, When Dealing with Mentally
Disturbed, Courts should Take Defendant's Illness Into Account, THE DAILY .U. STAR [ Sw.
TEX. ST. U.], Jan. 30, 2002, available at http://www.universitystar.com/02/01/30/
viewpoints.html (last checked April 13, 2003); see generally Brian E. Elkins, Idaho's Repeal
of the Insanity Defense?: What are We Trying to Prove, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151 (1994).
22 The M'Naghten test provides "that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). See infra notes 104-26
and accompanying text, for a detailed discussion of the M'Naghten rules.
23 RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 49 (1988).
24 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 27.
25 See, e.g., Sandy Meng Shan Liu, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: A Legitimate De-
fense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4 SCHOLAR 339, 389 (2002). The author argues
that "a statute must be created to treat infanticide cases and postpartum psychosis on the ba-
sis of an explicit justification and consider factors involving individual blameworthiness on a
case-by-case basis." Id. See, e.g., also Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum Psychosis: A New De-
fense?, Comment, 95 DICK. L. REV. 625 (1991). Nelson suggests that, because varying in-
sanity statutes result in inconsistent results in similar infanticide cases, "it is necessary to
address postpartum psychosis separately" and perhaps create a separate statute. Id. at 650.
26 For a general discussion of gender inequality in the law, see, for example, Dorothy
Roberts, The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I
(1994); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).
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cent scholarship that has suggested that there are as many as five dis-
tinct motives why women kill their children.27
This comment argues that the best solution for ensuring that
postpartum psychotic women can adequately present evidence of
their mental illness is for states to return to a broader insanity test. 8
A broader insanity test would allow the judges and the jury greater
leeway in assessing whether women diagnosed with postpartum psy-
chosis meet the statutory requirements of the state's homicide laws.29
Returning to an insanity defense test based on the American Law In-
stitute (ALI) test developed in 196230 would create a more flexible
means for assessing the culpability of postpartum psychotic infanti-
cide offenders.31 This comment asserts that there are three main rea-
sons why United States jurisdictions should return to a version of the
ALI insanity test.32 First, the M'Naghten test for legal insanity is an-
tiquated and does not reflect modem understanding of human psy-
chiatry.33 The M'Naghten test is particularly obsolete when applied
to postpartum psychotic women, because the test was developed
27 See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 36-38.
28 A broader insanity test would provide a more flexible standard. Many scholars who
have assessed the criminal law when applied to female offenders have argued that flexible
standards will most effectively incorporate the needs of female offenders. See, e.g., Stephen
J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995).
29 Since most states reverted back to a version of the M'Naghten rules after the Hinckley
acquittal in 1982, various state reports have noted the detriment of constructing a narrower
defense. The state of Maryland conducted a study (the Perkins study) which found that
eliminating the volitional prong from the insanity defense could exclude a "class of psy-
chotic patients whose illness is clearest in symptomatology, most likely biologic in origin,
most eminently treatable and potentially most disruptive in penal detention." GOVERNOR'S
TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE DEF. OF INSANITY, EXECUTIVE DEP'T, STATE OF MD., REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 25 (1983). For a de-
tailed discussion of the volitional prong of the insanity test, see infra notes 184-89 and ac-
companying text.
30 Many states enacted a version of the ALl test prior to the Hinckley acquittal in 1982.
See John L. Diamond, An Ideological Approach to Excuse in Criminal Law, 25 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 9 (1999). The American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code provides: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985).
31 See Reece, supra note 13, at 756. She notes that postpartum psychosis may fit a cog-
nitive or volitional insanity standard, but that broad interpretations of these standards are po-
tential "measures to adapt the criminal homicide law itself to the perspective of women." Id.
32 See infra notes 229-339 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these ar-
guments.
33 See infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
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within Victorian England when women's status within the law was
vastly different than today.34 Second, the test is too narrow because it
confines the legal insanity test to a consideration of whether the indi-
vidual knew the difference between right or wrong and not other as-
pects of mental illness that are equally relevant." Finally, the failure
of United States jurisdictions to adopt an insanity test that incorpo-
rates postpartum psychotic women reflects the criminal justice sys-
tem's perpetual inability to accommodate female criminal offend-
ers.
36
Part II of this comment provides the historical background of in-
fanticide and traces the development of postpartum depression re-
search. Part III analyzes the development of the insanity defense in
the United States and the original M'Naghten case on which this test
was modeled. 38  This section also assesses the status of women in
Victorian England and indicates why the M'Naghten standard is ob-
solete when applied today.39 Finally, Part IV explains why the insan-
ity defense test should be broadened and looks at specific postpartum
psychotic infanticide cases that illustrate the M'Naghten test's insuf-
ficiency.4"
II. BACKGROUND
A. POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION OVERVIEW
Understanding why the current insanity defense is too narrow to
adequately incorporate postpartum depression defenses requires a ba-
sic understanding of the mental illness known as postpartum depres-
sion." Moreover, recent research supports the assertion that the
34 See JOAN PERKIN, VICTORIAN WOMEN 73-74 (1993).
35 See infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
36 Feminists have argued that the law is inherently unequal and not accommodating to
women. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1284 (1991) ("An account of sex inequality under law in the United States
must begin with what white men have done and not done because they have created the
problem and benefited from it, controlled access to addressing it, and stacked the deck
against its solution.").
37 See infra notes 41-101 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 102-23 and accompanying text.
39 For a detailed account of women's evolution in the law, see infra notes 124-163.
40 See infra notes 227-336 and accompanying text.
41 Since the mass media attention surrounding the Yates case and similar trials, many
news articles and websites have suggested ways for women who believe they are suffering
from postpartum depression to find help. For example, one such way is through the internet,
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clinical aspects of postpartum depression, particularly seen in post-
partum psychosis cases, may help to explain why women kill their
children in some cases, and that these conditions could potentially
serve to mitigate sentences in infanticide cases.42 Depressive symp-
toms relating to childbirth occurred as early as the fourth century
B.C., when Hippocrates described a "severe case of insomnia and
restlessness that began on the sixth day in a woman who bore
twins.' However, the documentation of postpartum depression only
escalated during the last ten years.44 Researchers separate postpartum
depression into three different categories during the postpartum pe-
riod in relation to the degree of the women's symptoms, including
postpartum blues, postpartum depression, and postpartum psycho-
sis."
Women experience postpartum blues most frequently.46 Studies
have estimated that approximately 25% to 85% of women have ex-
perienced postpartum blues symptoms, including irritability, dimin-
ished appetite, crying, mood swings, anxiety, and disorientation,
sometime during the first two weeks after giving birth.47 The number
of women diagnosed with postpartum blues, however, ranges be-
tween 26% to 85%, depending upon the standards used in diagnosis.4"
Postpartum blues typically begin "within a few days of delivery and
last from a few hours to a few days," but rarely continue past twelve
days.
49
The second category is postpartum depression, a "clinical de-
pression occurring during the weeks and months following child-
birth."5 Psychiatrists diagnose postpartum depression according to
such as at the Depression after Delivery website, available at
http://www.depressionafterdelivery.com.
42 Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1098, 1109 (2000).
43 See SHARON L. ROAN, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: EVERY WOMAN'S GUIDE TO
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT & PREVENTION 24 (1997), quoted in Michael J. Davidson, Feminine
Hormonal Defenses: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis, 2000 ARMY LAW.
5, 9 n.63 (2000).
44 Julie Deardorff, A 2,d Look at a Mother's Crime; A Woman Who Says Postpartum De-
pression Moved Her to Kill Her Children in 1985 Gains Support as She Fights for Clem-
ency, CmI. TRIB., June 24, 2001, at Al.
45 Dobson & Sales, supra note 42, at 1104.
46 Id. (citations omitted).
47 Id. (citations omitted).
48 MICHAEL O'HARA, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 10 (1995).
49 Dobson & Sales, supra note 42, at 1104.
" Id. at 1105.
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standard mental health criteria or the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV).1 Postpartum depression is char-
acterized by "loss of interest in usually pleasurable activities, loss of
appetite, sleep disturbance, fatigue, difficulties in making decisions,
excessive guilt, and suicidal thoughts."52 Researchers have estimated
that as many as 5% to 20% of women experience postpartum depres-
sion after childbirth, and it usually emerges within the first six
months after giving birth.13 Other studies have further defined the
symptoms as including anxiety and nervousness, compulsive
thoughts, an inability to concentrate, "loss of interest in sexual activi-
ties, and an absence of feelings for the baby."54
A very small percentage of the women who develop postpartum
depression will experience postpartum psychosis, the most severe of
the three categories.55 Approximately 0.2% of childbearing women
will have psychotic episodes in which they will have "hallucinations
or delusions, severe depression, and thought disorder."56 The psy-
chosis typically emerges within the first two weeks after birth and
usually requires hospitalization. 7 The rarity of postpartum psychosis
is apparent from looking at the number of diagnoses during a specific
year.58 In 1992, for example, there were about 4,084,000 live births
in the United States and about 40% were "complicated by a mild
mood disturbance" or postpartum depression, approximately 10% of
women had major depression, and 0.2 % became psychotic. 9
The most revealing portrayal of postpartum psychosis is through
personal experience narratives.6 ° In 1987, for example, Dagmar
Celeste gave an address at a postpartum depression conference in Co-
lumbus, Ohio in which she described a personal postpartum psychotic
51 O'HARA, supra note 48, at 3; see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 386 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter DSM IV].
52 Dobson & Sales, supra note 42, at 1105.
53 MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 77.
54 VERTA TAYLOR, ROCK-A-BY-BABY: FEMINISM SELF-HELP AND POSTPARTUM
DEPRESSION 2 (1996).
55 MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 77.
56 Dobson & Sales, supra note 42, at 1106 (citations omitted).
57 Id.
58 O'HARA, supra note 48, at 2.
59 Id. O'Hara points out that "these percentages add up to a great deal of suffering each
year by women and their families."
60 Since Andrea Yates was incarcerated after drowning her five children, the media has
been flooded with personal accounts of postpartum depression. For example, the Oprah
Winfrey show recently held a show entitled "what your mother never told you about mother-
hood; women share their experiences after childbirth." April 1, 2003 at 2003 WL 5120579.
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episode.61 On one occasion, she told the audience, while she was
seated in the baby's room, "all hell broke loose."62 She said that "the
mobile above the baby's bed started to follow me around the house,
and the phone began to ring .... My speech turned into riddles and
rhymes, my body could not sit, I was terrified, and I felt like my soul
was in immediate danger., 63  Celeste was subsequently diagnosed
and hospitalized with postpartum psychosis after the birth of her sixth
child. She had also been under extreme stress due to attempting to
finish her college degree, caring for five children, and helping her
husband campaign for a bid for lieutenant governor, all while preg-
nant with her sixth child.64
Verta Taylor's study between 1985 and 1989 is another example
of research on postpartum depression over the last fifteen years that
has increased understanding of postpartum depression causes.6 In
order to gain an understanding of the illness, she conducted inter-
views with fifty-two women who believed they were suffering from
postpartum depression.66 She concluded that the pressures Celeste
experienced from her daily household responsibilities were poten-
tially a contributing factor to her stress and depression.67 The neces-
sity of having to care for children, along with the house, marriage,
and paid employment can greatly contribute to the stress of new
motherhood and drastically increase the chances that a woman would
experience some form of postpartum depression.68 Other studies
have also indicated that stress and disappointment relating to the lack
of help women received after their baby was born could contribute to
postpartum depression.6 9
61 TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 43.
62 Id.
63 Doctors have noted that a common symptom of a woman experiencing a postpartum
psychotic episode is believing her child is possessed by the devil or is some evil animal. Dr.
Susan Hickman, a psychotherapist, has commented that postpartum psychotic women some-
times suffer "bizarre delusions" and might believe their children are animals. Hallye Jordan,
Couple Seeks New Laws to Deal with Postpartum Depression, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 21, 1988,
at 2, col. 1.
64 See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 43.
65 See, e.g., id. at 56-58.
66 Id. at 11.
67 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 11, for a general discussion of women's multiple respon-
sibilities.
68 See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 42-43.
69 O'HARA, supra note 48, at 169 (In his study of over 200 women, he concluded that
"overall, childbearing women were disappointed in the amount of support that they received
from all sources after their babies were born." Id.).
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Researchers have further examined other possible postpartum
depression causal factors.7" Some studies have suggested that hor-
monal shifts relating to "pregnancy, childbirth, menstruation, and
menopause" are most likely the cause of postpartum depression.7
However, the entire medical community has not recognized postpar-
tum depression as a separate disorder, as identified by the DSM IV.
In the most current edition of the DSM, published in 1998, the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) incorporates postpartum
qualities within the general mental illness category by indicating that
some of these symptoms develop during the postpartum period.72
Thus, although the DSM IV refers to a "postpartum onset specifier,"
the manual includes postpartum depression within the general "mood
disorders" category by stating the symptomatology of postpartum de-
pression does "not differ from the symptomatology in nonpostpartum
mood episodes and may include psychotic features."73 The DSM IV
contains a mood disorders sections that classifies these disorders as
those that "have a disturbance in mood as the predominant feature."74
Nevertheless, psychiatrists generally believe that postpartum psycho-
sis does not have enough unique attributes to justify a separate listing
in the DSM IV.75
Various feminist scholars have argued against further delineation
of postpartum depression in the DSM because they may "reflect cul-
turally biased attitudes toward women" and suggest that all women
experience some form of a postpartum depression after childbirth.76
However, others have argued that one of the difficulties in having
postpartum psychosis recognized as a legitimate defense to infanti-
cide is the APA's reluctance to separately delineate the condition.77
While American courts have continued to grapple with the feasi-
bility of postpartum depression as a defense to infanticide since the
first woman raised this defense in 1951,78 several postpartum depres-
70 See Harold Winn, Postpartum Mental Disorders, in 6 GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS
(John J. Sciarra ed., 1983).
71 TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 29.
72 See OBERMAN & MEYER, supra note 20, at 71; DSM IV, supra note 52, at 386.
73 DSM IV, supra note 51, at 386.
4 Id. at 317.
75 O'HARA, supra note 48, at 3.
76 TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 48.
77 See Debora K. Dimino, Postpartum Depression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill
Their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 231 (1990).
78 See People v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d 473 (Il1. 1951); see also infra notes 265-75 and ac-
companying text (for a detailed discussion of this case).
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sion groups and national figures have attempted to educate the public
on the concept of postpartum depression.79 Both Depression After
Delivery and Postpartum Support International were established in
the 1980s in reaction to medical doctors who failed to recognize
postpartum depression as a tangible illness."0 Even such an infamous
figure as Princess Diana once mentioned in a 1995 television inter-
view that she had suffered such severe "postnatal depression" that she
could not get out of bed to perform her duties as "wife, mother, and
princess of Wales" for several months after the birth of her children.8"
As postpartum depression research continues and more doctors rec-
ognize the nuances of this condition, American courts still lag behind
in reassessing the insanity defense and its impact in postpartum psy-
chotic cases.82
The typical media attention that surrounds cases where mothers
kill their children suggests that infanticide cases are aberrant, but, in
reality, infanticide has occurred throughout history and is pervasive
across cultures for varying reasons.83 Thus, the next section exam-
ines infanticide's roots and addresses the need for insanity defense
reform as one way of addressing infanticide in modem culture. 4
B. INFANTICIDE
While Babylonian and Chaldean records dating from approxi-
mately 4000 to 2000 B.C.85 provide the earliest descriptions of infan-
ticide, numerous anthropological studies have concluded that infanti-
cide has occurred within populations all over the world for
centuries. 6 One anthropologist, for instance, asserted that infanticide
was the "most widely used method of population control during much
79 TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 5.
80 These were support groups designed to educate the women and public on the realities
of postpartum depression. Id. at 5, 55.
"t Id. at 3.
82 For a recent study that examines the link between postpartum psychosis, infanticide,
and medical perception of postpartum psychosis, see Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense
Judgments of Infanticide Murder, Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 1113 (2000).
83 See MARVIN HARRIS, CANNIBALS AND KINGS: THE ORIGINS OF CULTURES 22-23 (1977),
cited in Susan Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual Con-
cerns, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 439, 440 (Glenn
Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984) [hereinafter INFANTICIDE].
84 See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
85 MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 3.
86 See, e.g., Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, A Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanti-
cide, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 83, at 487, 490-91.
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of human history."87 Daly and Wilson have also argued that human
infanticide is widespread, and that it is typically pardoned in those
societies where it makes "adaptive sense" for it to occur.8 In 1970,
forensic psychiatrist Philip Resnick was the first to categorize infan-
ticide cases based on the age when the child was killed.89 He catego-
rized neonaticide as the killing of an infant just after birth or very
close to the time of birth, infanticide as the killing of a child up to one
year old, and filicide as the killing of a son or daughter older than one
year.90 Although Resnick's methodology has been criticized as out-
dated and "not specifically focused on women,"91 his classification
system still provides a general guideline that assists in assessing vari-
ances between modem day infanticide, neonaticide, and filicide
cases.
92
The difference between neonaticide and infanticide is an impor-
tant distinction that American courts should incorporate when sen-
tencing and addressing mothers who kill their children.93 Mothers
who commit neonaticide, the killing of a child within twenty-four
hours of birth, typically exhibit certain characteristics that separate
them from other infanticide offenders.94 Studies have documented
that neonaticide offenders are often single young women who deny
their pregnancy and kill their newborn infants in an effort to avoid the
social and parental pressure against an illegitimate child.95 While the
concept of "neonaticide syndrome" is a legal concept and not a "psy-
chiatric or psychological one" it articulates the view that mothers
who kill their children within the first twenty-four hours of birth of-
87 See HARRIS, supra note 83, at 22-23.
88 Daly & Wilson, supra note 86, at 487-502.
89 LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: NEONATICIDE,
INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 1 (2000).
90 Id.
91 MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 20.
92 Resnick was the main psychiatrist who testified for the defense in the Yates trial. He
said in testimony that Yates' psychosis made her believe that her children "were perma-
nently and irreparably harmed and the only thing she could do to save them from eternal
damnation was to take their lives." Psychiatrist: Yates Thought She Was Saving Kids,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 2002, at A15.
93 Few neonaticide offenders are diagnosed with postpartum psychosis and are therefore
out of the general realm of this comment.
94 See Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Note, Rethinking the Tough Sentencing
of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3109, 3132-33
(1999).
95 Id. at 3133 (citing C. M. Green & S. V. Manohar, Neonaticide and Hysterical Denial
of Pregnancy, 156 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 121, 122 (1990)).
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ten share characteristics - including denial, hiding the pregnancy, and
giving birth in an "isolated setting."96 Various studies in the 1990s
documented the denial of the neonaticidal mother in more detail.97
The distinction between infanticide and neonaticide cases is im-
portant in examining how different jurisdictions sentence mothers
who kill their children.9" Michelle Oberman and Cheryl Meyer pub-
lished the most recent study that assessed criminal cases in the United
States where mothers killed their children.99 They examined 219
cases of maternal filicide and separated the cases into five categories:
"filicide related to an ignored pregnancy," "abuse-related filicide,"
"filicide due to neglect," "assisted/coerced filicide," and "purposeful
filicide and the mother acted alone." ' These distinctions are impor-
tant because they indicate that all women who commit infanticide are
not suffering from postpartum psychosis."'
III. INSANITY DEFENSE BACKGROUND
Although England did not codify the insanity test in the
M'Naghten rules until 1843, various cultures have excused mentally
ill individuals from criminal responsibility.'0 2 For example, the an-
cient Romans recognized a non compos mentis (no power of mind)
concept that assisted in assessing criminal culpability. 10 3 And prior to
codifying the M'Naghten rules, England had grappled with various
other ways to incorporate insanity within the criminal court, includ-
ing the infamous "wild beast" test."0 4
The M'Naghten test was developed within nineteenth century
England and was eventually adopted in the United States as the basis
for federal and most state insanity defense tests.0 5 In 1843, Daniel
96 SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 84, at 84.
97 See WILCZYNSKI, supra note 17, at 39, 49-52; Barbara Ehrenreich, Where Have All the
Babies Gone?, LIFE, Jan. 1998, at 68. though assessing the sentencing for neonaticide of-
fenders is outside the scope of this comment that focuses upon the use of insanity defense for
postpartum psychotic cases, Fazio & Comito, supra note 94, at 3117-20, makes useful rec-
ommendations for assessing sentencing for neonaticide offenders.
98 See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
99 See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20.
'oo Id. at 36-38.
1o1 See Finkel, supra note 82, at 1120.
102 See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 71-72 (Nev. 2001).
103 SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 89, at 103.
104 See infra note 306 and accompanying text for a description of the wild beast test.
105 See RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF
DANIEL McNAUGHTAN 1 (1981).
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M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond, the private secretary to Prime
Minister Sir Robert Peel.1"6 M'Naghten believed that Drummond
was the prime minister. 1°7 Drummond died five days later and
M'Naghten was charged with first-degree murder.0 8  One of
M'Naghten's counselors, Alexander Cockburn, argued that his client
was "the victim of a fierce and fearful delusion" that made him be-
lieve that the Tories were his enemies.0 9 Cockburn argued further
that M'Naghten intended to kill the Prime Minister and erroneously
believed that Drummond was the Prime Minister."0 M'Naghten him-
self stated at his trial, "The Tories in my native city have compelled
me to do this. They follow [and] persecute me wherever I go, and
have entirely destroyed my peace of mind."'' . After numerous wit-
nesses testified that he was insane, M'Naghten was eventually acquit-
ted and sent to spend his life in a lunatic asylum." 2
The Times of London, however, reported that "the assassin
walked close up to Mr. Drummond, and, showing a determination not
to fail in the perpetration of the foul deed which he contemplated, ac-
tually put the muzzle of the pistol into the back of the unsuspecting
gentleman.""' This interpretation suggests that M'Naghten was not
suffering from a delusion, but intended to kill Drummond.
The public and the Queen of England thought the sentence of in-
sanity was too moderate." 4 All fifteen common law judges were
called to attend a hearing in the House of Lords to debate the pur-
poses of an insanity defense and to develop a more concrete rule."
1 5
In a letter, Queen Victoria expressed her outrage at the lenient sen-
tence, asserting:
106 Id.; Linda C. Fentiman, "Guilty but Mentally Ill": The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C.
L. REv. 601, 607 (1985).
107 MORAN, supra note 105, at 1.
108 Id.
'09 The Queen against Daniel MNaughton, in 4 REPORTS OF STATE TRIALS 875 (John E.
P. Wallis ed., 1892), cited in MORAN, supra note 105, at 1.
110 Katharine Drew, Diminished Capacity as a Result of Intoxication and Addiction: The
Capacity to Mitigate Punishment and the Need for Recognition in Texas Death Penalty Liti-
gation, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1, 11 (1998).
1 MORAN, supra note 105, at 10 (citing The Queen against Daniel M'Naghten, supra
note 109, at 875).
12 Id. at 116.
113 Id. at 7 (quoting THE TIMES OF LONDON, Jan. 21, 1843).
114 Fentiman, supra note 106, at 607.
115 See id.; MORAN, supra note 105, at 2 (citing T.C. HANSARD, Insanity and Crime, in 67
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 714-44 (1843)).
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The law may be perfect, but how is it that whenever a case for its application arises, it
proves to be of no avail? We have seen the trials of Oxford and MacNaughtan [sic]
conducted by the ablest lawyers of the day ... and they allow and advise the Jury to
pronounce the verdict of Not Guilty on account of Insanity, -whilst everybody is mor-
ally convinced that both malefactors were perfectly conscious and aware of what they
did!
116
Thus, from the public and Queen's reaction in 1843, the com-
mon law judges created the M'Naghten rules.' The M'Naghten
rules require that an individual must clearly prove that "at the time of
the committing of the act," he or she was "labouring under such a de-
fect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act" he or she was committing, and if he or she was
aware, he or she "did not know" that the act was wrong. 18
English newspapers noted that Daniel M'Naghten's case was
most likely based on a political motive." 9 The Standard newspaper,
for example, asserted that, regardless of whether M'Naghten was
sane or insane, it was the assassin's "hatred of Toryism" that made
him shoot Drummond.' Further, the paper reported that "if
McNaughtan [sic] be insane, then it is the festering of anti-Tory
rhetoric in an unsound mind that led to the murder of Edward Drum-
mond."'' The M'Naghten test emerged following M'Naghten's ac-
quittal because of pressure from the public and the Crown to make
the insanity test narrower, so that in cases similar to M'Naghten's,
the individual would not be so easily acquitted for reason of insan-
ity."' Therefore, under the stricter M'Naghten rules, M'Naghten
himself would most likely "be judged sane and legally culpable by
the standards of the rules which bear his name."'
23
In creating the M'Naghten insanity test, the English court did not
consider how the test would impact women. During Victorian times,
women were considered subservient citizens and had relegated status
within the law.' 24 In 1843, stereotypes regarding women's sexuality,
116 Royal Archives, A 14/8, reprinted in MORAN, supra note 105, at 21.
117 Fentiman, supra note 106, at 607.
118 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
119 See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
120 MORAN, supra note 105, at 13 (quoting STANDARD, Jan. 26, 1843, at 1 col. 6).
121 Id. at 13.
122 Id. at 111.
123 Id. at 109.
124 Cf MacKinnon, supra note 36, at 1284. MacKinnon has noted that women have had
"second-class citizenship" under the law throughout its development.
2003]
JESSIE MANCHESTER
inferiority, and hysterical tendencies abounded.125 According to law,
when women married, their husband retained rights over the children
and all of his wife's property unless they had prearranged a different
agreement.'26  There were also outlandish notions regarding female
sexuality, and women who expressed pleasure in sexual tendencies
were deemed atypical and often viewed as potentially "insane.'
' 27
For example, William Acton, a British expert on venereal disease,
wrote in 1857 "the majority of women (happily for society) are not
very much troubled with sexual feeling of any kind.' ' 128 Acton, how-
ever, "admit [ted]" the "sexual excitement terminating even in nym-
phomania, a form of insanity that those accustomed to visit lunatic
asylums must be fully conversant with" but noted that "with these sad
exceptions, there can be no doubt that sexual feeling in the female is
in the majority of cases in abeyance."'
' 29
Furthermore, there were very distinct theories regarding Victo-
rian women and criminality at this time. 3 ° If a woman committed a
crime within her husband's presence, excluding murder and high
treason, "the law presumed that she was coerced by him and was
therefore innocent.''. Notably, women in Victorian England made
up 17% of the daily average local and convict prison population
(which is more than the amount of less than 4% of the population re-
corded in 1991). 132 When women were charged with crimes, their
sentences and public perception were closely related to the "carefully
constructed notions of ideal womanhood" that pervaded Victorian
125 See PERKIN, supra note 34, at 1; LUCIA ZEDNER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CUSTODY IN
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 11 (1991). Dr. Gover, for example, a medical officer at Millbank
prison, wrote a letter to the chairman of the prison commissioners Sir Edmund Du Cane that
"as regards women, it is advisable as far as possible to avoid associating together those who
are laboring under the same form of mental defect or disease, and this particularly applies to
women who are partially or wholly imbeciles. When a number of such women are placed
together, the result is, in many cases, a development of the hysterical tendency or element to
a point which is injurious, and which renders the subject of it difficult of managements."
ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 284 (citations omitted).
126 PERKIN, supra note 34, at 73.
127 Id. at 51-52.
128 VICTORIAN WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY ACCOUNT OF WOMEN'S LIVES IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 177, Ema Olafson Hellerstein et al.
eds., 1981) [hereinafter VICTORIAN WOMEN] (quoting WILLIAM ACTON, THE FUNCTIONS AND
DISORDERS OF THE REPRODUCTIVE ORGANS 208-12 (8th American ed. 1894)).
129 id.
"3' See ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 11.
131 PERKIN, supra note 34, at 74.
132 ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 1.
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English society. 33 Victorians easily justified the lower number of fe-
male criminals, because it contrasted sharply with the image of the
ideal Victorian woman as maternal, feminine, and morally supe-
rior."' Reverend W. D. Morrison, a prison chaplain of H.M. prison
in Wandsworth, accounted for fewer female criminals based upon
women's maternal instinct. He wrote in 1891:
The care and nurture of children has been their lot in life for untold centuries; the du-
ties of maternity have perpetually kept alive a certain number of unselfish instincts;
these instincts have become part and parcel of woman's natural inheritance, and, as a
result of possessing them to a larger extent than man, she is less disposed to crime.135
Morrison also noted that "it would be an infinitely superior state of
things if society did not require women's work beyond the confines
of the home and the primary school."' 36
New England and English cultures before and during the Victo-
rian era had already begun to recognize infanticide and to construct
remedies within the justice system.137 English settlers to Massachu-
setts and Connecticut brought the crime of infanticide to New Eng-
land when they settled there. 138  Even early accounts of infanticide
suggested that women who killed their children were potentially suf-
fering from postpartum depression or mental illness. 39 For example
in 1638, Dorothy Talbye was hung in Boston for killing her child,
and a Puritan magistrate recorded the event. 40 Although she be-
longed to the Church of Salem and was of "good esteem for godli-
ness" she still found herself "falling at difference with her husband,
through melancholy or spiritual delusions" and "she sometimes at-
tempted to kill him and her children.''. Although the magistrate's
words suggested he thought she was delusional and potentially men-
tally ill, the magistrate made no suggestion that she should be ex-
cused from the crime or that her sentence should be mitigated.'42
133 Id. at 11.
134 Id. at 40-41.
131 WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON, CRIME AND ITS CAUSES 15 2 (1891).
136 Id. at 157.
137 PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND
ANDNEW ENGLAND 1558-1803 33-35 (1981).
13 Id. at 33.
139 For a further discussion of Hoffer & Hull's study and a general development history
of infanticide statutes in seventeenth and eighteenth century England and New England, see
Oberman supra note 8, at 9-17.
140 HOFFER & HULL, supra note 137, at 40.
141 id.
142 Id. at 41.
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At times during the colonial period in England and New Eng-
land, various laws that punished women for having "bastard" children
provided a motive for infanticide.'43 For example, in 1624 the Eng-
lish Parliament passed the "Act to Prevent the Destroying and Mur-
dering of Bastard Children."' 4 This law made it a capital offense to
hide the birth of an illegitimate child. 145 In 1849, the last woman was
hung in England for infanticide. 46 Since then, England constructed
infanticide laws, culminating in the 1922 and 1938 (repealing and re-
placing the 1922 act) Infanticide Acts.147 The English Infanticide Act
of 1938 established that women who commit infanticide within a year
after childbirth are potentially suffering from postpartum psychosis
and automatically reduced the charges for neonaticide and infanticide
from murder to manslaughter.1
48
The Infanticide Acts reflected the assumption that after child-
birth women suffered from a type of lunacy or mental condition spe-
cifically related to their recent experience of becoming mothers. 4 9 In
Victorian England, the condition was labeled as "puerperal mania"
and women were considered to be "seriously mentally debilitated"
after childbirth and thus the general public was "primed to excuse the
new mother as not fully responsible for her actions."' 50 Puerperal in-
sanity represented about ten percent of females admitted to asy-
lums. "' This form of insanity relating to childbirth was viewed typi-
cally as a legitimate defense for numerous crimes, including
infanticide. '52
In addition to assumed postpartum depression after childbirth,
women were viewed as more susceptible to most mental deficiencies
in Victorian England. 5 3 This concept was reflected in the number of
"'3 id. at 53.
144 Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murdering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jam. 1, c.
27 (Eng.), reprinted in HOFFER & HULL, supra note 137, at 19-20.
145 Oberman, supra note 8, at 9.
146 Id.
147 SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 89, at 84.
148 See Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36 (Eng.).
149 See ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 89; Elaine Showalter, Victorian Women and Insanity,
in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS AND MADMEN (Andrew Scull ed., 1981). Even William
Thackeray's wife Isabella became suicidal after the birth of their third child, and Thackeray
attempted to find an asylum to leave his wife in during the 1840s. Id. at 314.
"0 Showalter, supra note 149, at 88.
151 Id.
152 ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 323.
113 Id. at 264.
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women who were placed in asylums during the Victorian era after
Parliament passed legislation requiring sufficient asylum treatment
for pauper lunatics (those "lunatics" whose care came completely or
mostly from public funds). 5 4 By 1871, women constituted more than
half of the pauper lunatics in England,'55 and by the end of the nine-
teenth century, all asylums including lunatic, public and private asy-
lums had more women than men."5 6 Lunacy in Victorian England was
also connected with class, income, and poverty level.5 7 Thus, the lu-
nacy reform act in 1845 that expanded the number of pauper or poor
lunatics requiring care greatly expanded the number of women insti-
tutionalized.'58 Indeed, certain types of insanity were directly related
to malnutrition resulting from poverty.5 9 Mothers of large families,
for example, often were diagnosed with "lactational insanity" be-
cause they nursed their babies for extended periods to save money
and avoid further pregnancy.'60
The idea that women were more susceptible to mental deficien-
cies that might lead to crime was often expressed during the Victo-
rian era.'6 ' Henry Maudsley, for instance, gave a lecture in 1870
where he noted that women had a variety of biological and hormonal
characteristics that could contribute to female crime.'62 Maudsley as-
serted that "cases have occurred in which women, under the influence
of derangement of their special bodily functions, have been seized
1 Showalter, supra note 149, at 315.
I5 Id. at 315-16.
116 ld. at 3 16.
157 id.
.58 I. at 316.
59 Id. at 317.
160 Id.
161 See generally MORRISON, supra note 135.
162 ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 87 (citing HENRY MAUDSLEY, Lecture Three-On the Re-
lations of Morbid Bodily States to Disordered Mental States, in BODY AND MIND: AN
INQUIRY INTO THEIR CONNECTION AND MENTAL INFLUENCE 79-89 (1870)); see also
Showalter, supra note 149, at 322 (quoting T.S. CLOUSTON, CLINICAL LECTURES ON MENTAL
DISEASES 581-82, (5th ed. 1898)). T.S. Clouston believed that women's biological functions
were closely related to their predilection for insanity. He wrote,
The risks to the mental functions of the brain from the exhausting calls of menstruation, mater-
nity, and lactation, from the nervous reflex influences of ovulation, conception and parturition,
are often enormous if there is much original predisposition to derangement, and the normally
profound influences on all the brain functions of the great eras of puberty and the climacteric pe-
riod are too apt, in these circumstances, to upset the brain stability.
2003]
JESSIE MANCHESTER
with an impulse, which they have or have not been able to resist, to
kill or to set fire to property or to steal. 163
A. INSANITY DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States adopted the M'Naghten insanity test in all but
two states and used this as the primary test for legal insanity until
1954.164 Alabama was one of the few states that developed a variance
to the M'Naghten test in Parsons v. State (1877). 115 In this case, the
court established the irresistible impulse test because it considered
the M'Naghten test too narrow.'66 The court asked: "may there not be
insane persons, of a diseased brain, who, while capable of perceiving
the difference between right and wrong, are, as a matter of fact, so far
under the duress of such disease as to destroy the power to choose
between right and wrong?"'' 6 7 Thus, in addition to the right or wrong
test established in M'Naghten, the Alabama court created another test
that did not focus solely upon knowing whether an action was right or
wrong, but upon whether the individual was able to "adhere in action
to the right and abstain from the wrong."' 68 Several other United
States jurisdictions supplemented the M'Naghten test with an "irre-
sistible impulse" component thereafter, including the District of Co-
lumbia in 1929.169
In 1954, however, the District of Columbia constructed a variant
to the insanity defense in Durham v. United States.7 ' This case in-
volved an individual who had a long history of hospitalizations due to
mental illness and psychiatric problems and was prosecuted for bur-
glary.' Judge Bazelon, considering the individual's frequent psy-
163 ZEDNER, supra note 125, at 87 (citing HENRY MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL
DISEASE (1874)).
164 MORAN, supra note 105, at 2. (New Hampshire and Alabama were the two states that
adopted different approaches).
165 Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 859 (Ala. 1887).
166 The court determined that if the M'Naghten rule
declared by the English judges be correct, it necessarily follows that the only possible instance of
excusable homicide, in cases of delusional insanity, would be where the delusion, if real, would
have been such as to create, in the mind of a reasonable man, a just apprehension of imminent
peril to life or limb.
Id. at 865-66.
167 Id. at 859.
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
170 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
' Id. at 864.
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chotic episodes and hospitalizations commented that: "Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame."' Thus, the court established that "an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental dis-
ease or mental defect."'
' 73
The court reasoned that the "legal and moral traditions of the
western world require that those who, of their own free will and with
evil intent ... commit acts which violate the law, shall be criminally
responsible for those acts. 17' 4 Hence, it added that the "traditions"
also require that those whose acts result from mental disease cannot
have moral blame attach and therefore cannot be criminally responsi-
ble.175 Although the Durham rule signified a substantial change in in-
sanity defense jurisprudence, no other court adopted the D.C. Court
of Appeals' approach.1 76 Opponents of the Durham rule believed it
was too broad and gave psychiatrists too much leeway to explain the
psychological background of criminal defendants.1 77 However, the
holding in Durham established by the D.C. Circuit was later struck
down in United States v. Brawner.178 In Brawner, the court adopted
the American Law Institute (ALI) test. 179
After Durham v. United States, many American jurisdictions
adopted the ALI test, established in 1962.180 The test indicated that:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the
law."' 1 The ALI test therefore added both a cognitive (intellectual)
172 Id. at 876 (citing Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
Judge Bazelon further pointed out that the jury's inquiry should not be limited to just a con-
sideration of whether the defendant knew his or her actions were right or wrong: "The jury's
range of inquiry will not be limited to, but may include, for example, whether an accused,
who suffered from a mental disease or defect did not know the difference between right and
wrong, acted under the compulsion of an irresistible impulse ... " Id.
171 Id. at 874-75. For a general discussion of the difference between the ALI test and the
M'Naghten rules, see Diamond, supra note 30, at 9 and Elkins, supra note 21, at 162-70.
17' Durham, 214 F.2d at 876.
171 Id. at 876.
176 JOS1HUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 298, 317 (2d ed. 1995).
177 Id. at 323.
178 471 F.2d 969 (1972).
179 Id.
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985).
181 MORAN, supra note 105, at 19.
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and volitional ("ability to choose or control") prong 182 to the test,
while the M'Naghten rules only incorporated a cognitive aspect to the
insanity defense test.1 3 The two-pronged ALI test, which broadened
M'Naghten by changing the language from "know" to "appreciate,"
made it easier for individuals to meet the legal definition of insan-
ity."' Since the M'Naghten test does not define "know," the jury is
left to "determine the meaning based on the expert testimony re-
ceived at trial."' 5 This has sparked debate throughout discussions of
the insanity defense. 8 6 By 1981, the model penal code/ALI test was
used in all federal circuits, excluding one."8 7
. Other states attempted to create verdicts and methods to address
the mentally ill in addition to the ALI test. 188 Michigan established
the guilty but mentally ill (GMI) verdict in 1975. The GMI verdict
allows a judge or jury to find a defendant guilty but mentally ill if
they find that the defendant was guilty of the offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the defendant did not meet the test for legal insan-
ity (which was based upon the M'Naghten rule in Michigan), and that
the defendant was mentally ill at the time the offense was commit-
ted.'89 The GMI verdict, while still utilized in some jurisdictions to-
day, has been criticized and viewed as a "compromise verdict" be-
182 See John Dent, Note, Postpartum Psychosis and the Insanity Defense, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 355 (1989), for a general discussion of the volitional prong and how the American
Law Institute test differed from the M'Naghten test. The volitional prong means a "defendant
can claim insanity if the mental disease or defect rendered her unable to conform her conduct
to the requirements of the law, even if she could substantially appreciate the criminality of
her conduct," therefore broadening the test beyond just a consideration of whether or not the
defendant knew their conduct was right or wrong. Id.
183 INGO KEILITZ & JUNIUS P. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A
GUIDELINE FOR POLICY MAKERS 7 (1984).
184 Christine Ann Gardner, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting Away
with Murder, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 968 (1990).
185 RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 14 (1988). There is a differ-
ence between "know" and "appreciate." "Know" has been interpreted to "mean either an
actual understanding that the act committed was a crime, or it can mean the inability to per-
ceive that the act was morally wrong." Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in
Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46 LA. L. REV. 337, 352 (1985). On the other
hand, some have argued that "appreciate" is broader definition of know, and certain judges
have used the term interchangeably, Id. at 352-53 (citing A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 60, 61 (1967)).
186 See SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 185, at 14.
187 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 17.
188 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982).
189 Id.
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cause it allows jurors to believe the defendant will get medical treat-
ment once imprisoned but will still keep the defendant incarcer-
ated. 9° Some researchers have argued that the purpose of state legis-
lation that establishes GMI verdicts is often to assist prosecutors in
convicting defendants who would likely be acquitted under tradi-
tional insanity tests.'91 While the GMI verdict is supposed to allow
defendants to get treatment once incarcerated, 9 ' Michigan, for exam-
ple, approves treatment for mental illness only as is "psychiatrically
indicated," and studies have shown that not all defendants convicted
under the GMI verdict will in fact receive treatment.'93 The GMI
verdict reform has been called "at best, cosmetic, and, at worst, mere-
tricious" precisely because treatment is not guaranteed under this
verdict, and the verdict merely reflects society's "ambivalence" on
how to address the mentally ill.' 94 Furthermore, numerous profes-
sional organizations have opposed the GMI verdict, including the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association,
as relating to treatment reasons. 195
The most dramatic impact on insanity defense jurisprudence that
continues to resonate occurred in 1982, when John Hinckley, Jr. was
acquitted by reason of insanity for attempting to assassinate President
Reagan.' 96 The American public was outraged that John Hinckley, Jr.
(whose assassination attempt had been televised) was acquitted. A
major backlash against the insanity defense erupted. 97 An ABC
news poll reported that 76% of the American public did not think jus-
tice was done; 90% did not think Hinckley should go free even if he
recovered from mental illness-even though 78% also believed he
190 SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 185, at 190.
191 KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 183, at 42.
192 Drew, supra note 110, at 24.
193 Fentiman, supra note 106, at 628.
194 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 95.
195 SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 185, at 200.
196 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F.Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), clarified by 529 F.Supp.
520 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "Acquittal" does not mean that the
defendant is set free. Jurisdictions have interpreted not guilty by reason of insanity in vary-
ing ways. The Supreme Court determined in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 355
(1983), that a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" could mean a sentence of lifetime
commitment in a mental institute. However, other insanity acquittees may spend less time in
confinement because of increased use of anti-psychotic medication. See Fentiman, supra
note 106, at 613.
197 SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 187, at 1.
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would go free after treatment.1 98 The U.S. Attorney General asked
for an end to a "doctrine that allows so many persons to commit
crimes of violence, to use confusing procedures to their own advan-
tage, and then to have the door opened for them to return to the soci-
ety they victimized."' 99 Various members of Congress followed pub-
lic sentiment and criticized the insanity defense.200 Congressman
Myers called the insanity defense a "safe harbor" for criminals who
"bamboozle a jury... into thinking they should not be held responsi-
ble."' In response to the Hinckley acquittal and public outrage,
Congress enacted the 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act [IDRA] that
weakened the ALI two-prong test and once again aligned the insanity
defense more closely with the M'Naghten rules."2 The IDRA lan-
guage demonstrates the difference between the new Act and the ALI
test:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a de-
fense.
203
The IDRA had major consequences on the insanity defense
across all jurisdictions. It changed the insanity defense from the ALI
test, because the Act eliminated the volitional element that had
broadened the insanity defense and allowed an individual to be found
not guilty by reason of insanity if the individual could not "conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
204
The IDRA also dramatically shifted the burden of proof in insan-
ity defense cases. 2" Before the IDRA, the burden of proof in all fed-
eral courts and about half of the state courts was on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant's sanity.26 After IDRA
was passed, the burden of proof in insanity defense cases was placed
on the defendant to prove his or her insanity by "clear and convincing
19' Steven V. Roberts, High U.S. Officials Express Outrage, Asking for New Law on In-
sanity Plea, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1982, at B6.
199 Id.
200 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 17-24.
201 Id. at 18.
202 SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 185, at 49.
203 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 111984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2002)).
204 SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 185, at 49.
205 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 96.
206 Miller, supra note 185, at 356 n.127.
[Vol. 93
BEYOND A CCOMODA TION
evidence., 27 The "clear and convincing evidence" standard was no-
tably more stringent than the "preponderance" of the evidence stan-
dard that was previously used in those jurisdictions where the burden
was on the defendant to prove insanity.218 In his research on insanity
defense jurisprudence, Michael Perlin commented that there "is no
question that Congress recognized the heaviness" of the clear and
convincing evidence burden that IDRA placed on the defendant.2 9
Congress' acknowledgement of this harsh burden is suggested from
the House Judiciary's decision not to pass IDRA out of committee,
because it was "a radical departure... not justified by the evidence
of problems with the current operation of the defense. ',2 0  Research
has suggested that judges do, in fact, interpret this burden more
harshly than they formerly interpreted the "preponderance of the evi-
dence standard," and that the majority of judges interpret the "clear
and convincing evidence standard" to mean that a defendant must
show with seventy to eighty percent of the evidence that they meet
the legal definition of insane.2"'
States followed the lead of the federal courts after IDRA was
passed.212 Twelve states adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict,
seven states narrowed their existing insanity defense test, sixteen
shifted the burden of proof to favor the government, twenty-five
tightened release standards upon when an individual found not guilty
by reason of insanity could be released from treatment and observa-
tion, and three adopted legislation to eradicate the insanity defense
completely, but retain an absence of mens rea exception to homicide
laws.213 Still other jurisdictions recognized a diminished capacity de-
fense that is a partial defense to murder rather than the full insanity
defense. The diminished capacity defense typically refers to "mental
conditions, less than insanity, that impact on the defendant's ability,
207 18 U.S.C. § 20(b) (Supp. 11 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (2002)). This
is the nature of an affirmative defense; the defendant bears the burden of proof, not the plain-
tiff. For a further discussion of the application of this standard to the insanity defense, see
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence or Constitu-
tional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293 (1982).
208 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 97 (citing Julian N. Eule, The Presumption of Sanity Burst-
ing the Bubble, 25 UCLA L. REV. 637, 670 (1978)).
209 id.
210 Id.
211 See McCauliff, supra note 207, at 1328-29.




or inability to control his own behavior." '214 Several state legislatures
have recognized the diminished capacity defense as a means of ad-
dressing mental ailments or other factors within an individual defen-
dant's case as a way of potentially mitigating punishment.215 The de-
fense of diminished capacity has been acknowledged in thirty-one
states.216 The diminished capacity defense can potentially reduce a
charge to manslaughter and can negate the specific intent necessary
in a particular crime.217 Thus, after the Hinckley acquittal and the
subsequent passage of the IDRA, the majority of states moved away
from the ALI test for insanity and back to variations of the stricter
M'Naghten rule.218 Some states even adopted the M'Naghten rule by
formal legislation.1 9 Other states adopted the M'Naghten rule by ju-
dicial decision.
While IDRA reflects the public's sentiment over the insanity de-
fense, in reality the insanity defense is rarely used.221 One study has
shown that during the ten years after Hinckley's acquittal, less than
one insanity plea was used for every 100 felony indictments.222 Out
of 586,063 felony indictments, only 5302 insanity pleas were en-
tered.223 Only 22.7% of these insanity pleas were successful.224 The
insanity defense, therefore, is successful in only a fraction of one per-
cent of all cases. Nonetheless, American society is obsessed with the
potential inadequacies of this defense. 25 At least three states, includ-
ing Utah, Montana, and Idaho, have abolished the insanity defense. 6
214 Drew, supra note 110, at 3.
215 See id. at 6-7 n.22, for a list of state statutes.
216 Id. at 4 n.1l.
217 DONALD ALEXANDER DowNs, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE
SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 4 (1996).
218 HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY
DEFENSE REFORM 149 (1993).
219 See Drew, supra note 110, at 10-11 n.41, for a comprehensive list of state statutes.
220 Id.
221 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 218, at 150.
222 Id. at 170. This study included the jurisdictions of California, Georgia, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin.
223 Id. at 150.
224 Id.
225 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 3-4.
226 See Daniel J. Nusbaum, Comment, The Craziest Reform of them All: A Critical
Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" the Insanity Defense, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 1509, 1515 (2002); Emily S. Pollock, Comment, Those Crazy Kids: Pro-




A. INSANITY DEFENSE: ANTIQUATED AND BASED ON MALE
STANDARD
The first reason why the insanity defense test should be broad-
ened, especially in light of current judicial handling of postpartum
psychosis cases, is because the M'Naghten standard is obsolete and
was formulated within the precepts of Victorian England, when
women had relegated status under the law.2"7 Psychiatrists have long
recognized that the M'Naghten test is "scientifically outdated," be-
cause it incorporates only the cognitive aspects of mental disability in
spite of further developments in modem psychiatric theory.228 The
M'Naghten test considers whether the individual was able to know
that her actions were legally wrong229 and thus fails to account for ir-
rational impulses and delusions that are common characteristics of
many mental illnesses.23 ° Furthermore, psychiatrists have pointed out
that the M'Naghten insanity test reflects the "prevailing intellectual
and scientific ideas of the times" '231 and emerged from an "immutable
philosophical and moral concept, which assumes an inherent capacity
in man to distinguish right from wrong and to make necessary moral
decisions."232
The M'Naghten test, however, is not only antiquated because it
was developed over a century ago, but also because it was created in
response to a particular political assassination.233 Daniel M'Naghten
was likely not even "mentally ill" in the modem sense, because there
was strong evidence that his assassination attempt of the Prime Min-
ister was politically motivated.234 Indeed, even Victorian psycholo-
227 See supra notes 116-63 and accompanying text for background.
228 DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 321.
229 In the Yates trial, the prosecution's expert witness psychiatrist Dr. Park Dietz testified
that Yates was mentally ill, but failed the M'Naghten test because she knew that drowning
her children was wrong. Leigh Hopper, Yates Case Exposes Holes in Insanity-Plea Laws,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 11,2002 at A 1, A 10.
230 Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating
the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 304-
05 (1998).
231 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 81.
232 Ralph Brancale, More on McNaughten: A Psychiatrist's View, 65 DICK. L. REv. 277
(1961).
233 See supra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
234 See MoRAN, supra note 105, at 4.
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gists suspected that M'Naghten was not mentally debilitated.2 3 ' Dr.
Henry Maudsley, for example, recognized that M'Naghten had
"transacted business a short time before" the shooting and had
"shown no obvious symptoms of insanity in his ordinary discourse
and conduct.,
236
Modem scholars have also criticized the M'Naghten test, be-
cause it was created in reaction to a political assassination.2 37 Scholar
Richard Moran has pointed out that many researchers have over-
looked the fact that Daniel M'Naghten's crime was a "political act"
and that "[1]egal scholars have displayed a marked tendency to accept
uncritically McNaughten's [sic] alleged insanity., 238  When
M'Naghten's case is scrutinized within the political climate of Victo-
rian England, Moran argues that the court arrived at its insanity ver-
dict in reaction to the political climate. The insanity verdict "under-
cut the rationality and legitimacy" of M'Naghten's political cause
because it removed him from society and confined him to a mental
hospital.239
The M'Naghten rules are particularly outmoded when applied to
women's issues such as postpartum psychosis.24 ° In Victorian Eng-
land, women were perceived as particularly susceptible to mental de-
ficiency, an unfounded hypothesis replete with obvious gender bias.
241 This gender-biased view was based upon an essentialist standard
that assumed the law was made solely for application to white
males.242 Indeed, cultural defenses and defenses such as battered
women's syndrome are increasingly accepted in various jurisdictions,
thus suggesting that the law is becoming less essentialist.243 Broaden-
ing the insanity defense is a simple measure that would recognize that
235 See MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 95.
236 Id.
237 See generally MORAN, supra note 105.
238 Id. at 4.
239 Id. at 6. Further, Moran asserts that finding M'Naghten guilty by reason of insanity
was just necessary to make M'Naghten an "unattractive role model" to "discourage others
from committing similar crimes." Finally, a guilty verdict could have resulted in a public
hanging and might have made M'Naghten into a martyr for sacrificing his life for his politi-
cal views. Id.
240 See infra notes 260-31 1 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 124-63 and accompanying text.
242 See MacKinnon, supra note 36.
243 See Laura E. Reece, Comment, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, I UCLA




the essentialist M'Naghten rules are no longer adaptive to modem re-
alities and would reflect the interests of postpartum psychotic
women.
244
The second reason the M'Naghten test should be broadened is
because the test is too narrow and does not reflect modem under-
standing of mental capacity. 245 Since its adoption, critics have recog-
nized that an insanity defense test that relies upon only one aspect of
the human brain is impracticable. 246  Dr. Henry Maudsley claimed
that:
It is obvious that the knowledge of right and wrong is different from the knowledge of
an act being contrary to the law, because, by reason of insanity, he believes it to be
right, because, under the influence of insane delusion, he is a law unto himself, and
deems it a duty to do it.
247
In 1892, Maudsley also examined the extension of the insanity
defense to the United States and commented that in America "it
would seem that matters have been little better than they are in this
country, the practice of the courts, like that of the British Courts, hav-
ing been diverse and fluctuating., 248  Thus, the more modem criti-
cisms of this test in the United States are hardly surprising.249
Since its adoption, American psychiatrists have disliked the
M'Naghten test for its "apparent absolutism," an absolutism that can
force doctors to conform their testimony to fit the legal definition,
which in turn can severely limit the evidence psychiatrists may prof-
fer to a jury, including a full discussion of the defendant's mental his-
tory. Since the 1960s, psychiatrists have criticized the M'Naghten
test for its misconception of human behavior. The test assumes that
individuals have "an inherent capacity" to "distinguish right from
wrong and to make necessary moral decisions. 2 5 ' Others have noted
that the M'Naghten rules were developed based upon a standard that
"bore little resemblance to what was known about the human
mind. 2 12 Modem psychiatrists have emphasized the importance of
244 See infra notes 260-311 and accompanying text for application to specific postpartum
psychosis cases.
245 See Brancale, supra note 232, for a general discussion of the major problems that still
resonate throughout the debate of the M'Naghten test.
246 DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 320-21.
247 MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 98.
248 Id. at 102.
249 See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
250 DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 320-21.
25 Brancale, supra note 232, at 277.
252 PERLIN, supra note 18, at 82.
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volitional capacity in assessing mental illness.253 However, oppo-
nents of the ALI test 254 argue that it is too broad, because there is no
certainty as to whether psychiatrists can "provide reliable data" on
the volitional prong.255 Nevertheless, returning to a broader test
would at least enable the jury to focus upon pertinent testimony re-
garding a postpartum psychotic woman's prior depressive history, in-
stead of upon whether or not the defendant knew her actions were
wrong. 256
While insanity defense jurisprudence and court application of the
M'Naghten rules have been labeled "incoherent" when examined on
a whole, 257 they are particularly inconsistent when applied to post-
partum psychosis cases. 2" The antiquated and overly narrow aspects
of the M'Naghten insanity test, however, are most apparent from ana-
lyzing specific cases involving postpartum psychotic women. 9
B. ANTIQUITY REFLECTED: APPLICATION TO POSTPARTUM
PSYCHOTIC WOMEN
Recent cases have produced widespread media and public com-
ment that suggests how defective most state insanity tests are when
applied to postpartum psychotic cases.26° The narrow and antiquated
M'Naghten rules have had particular complications on the use of
postpartum psychosis as a defense to infanticide.2 61 Inconsistent sen-
tencing is therefore reflective of the ambivalence and variances in in-
sanity defenses available to women who are diagnosed with postpar-
tum psychosis.
2 62
253 DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 321.
254 It is important to keep in mind the ALI test has both a volitional and a cognitive
prong.
255 DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 322.
256 A broader test would help the jury to compare the legal definition of insanity with the
reality of the defendant's mental disease.
257 SeePERLIN,supra note 18, at 81-82.
258 See infra notes 260-311 and accompanying text.
259 Id.
260 This comment focuses on the application of the insanity defense when women were
diagnosed with the most extreme form of postpartum depression, postpartum psychosis, or
where there was sufficient evidence presented at trial suggesting that the woman suffered
from a psychotic episode at the time of committing the act.
261 See infra notes 255-99 and accompanying text.
262 See Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 80 (1994).
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Although juries have acquitted women who have entered an in-
sanity defense based on postpartum psychosis in certain jurisdic-
tions,2 3 a broader test should ensure that juries across jurisdictions
are sufficiently able to analyze evidence that a woman was suffering
from postpartum psychosis. Indeed, the first woman who attempted
to use a postpartum psychosis defense in the United States was ac-
quitted in 1951 based upon the M'Naghten rule.264 In People v.
Skeoch, the defendant went crying and sobbing to her neighbor's
door to ask for help, because there was something wrong with her
baby.265 The neighbor returned to the defendant's apartment and
found the baby lying on the bed with a plastic diaper tied around its
neck and covering its mouth.266 The defendant claimed that a robber
had taken her money and watch; she had fainted and when she re-
vived her child had been strangled. 267 The defendant subsequently
confessed to killing the six-day-old child by tying a diaper around the
child's neck after it was fussing and crying.268 The court noted that
prior to giving birth, the defendant wrote to her parents saying,
"Sometimes I feel like turning on the gas and forgetting every-
thing."269 The defendant's husband testified that after his wife gave
birth "she talked very little, appeared to be concentrating on some-
thing, would not speak unless she was spoken to, and was very quiet
and depressed."27 Both a neurologist and psychiatrist testified that
the defendant was likely insane and "suffering from post partum psy-
chosis with infanticide, a mental disorder which frequently occurs
with delivery of a child. 271 Based upon this evidence, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed the defendant's murder conviction.7
In the California case of People v. Massip, Sheryl Lynn Massip
suffered from hallucinations, suicidal thoughts, and severe depression
after the birth of her son.273 Massip had attempted to seek medical
help for her mental state prior to the offense. 274  Her obstetrician
263 See People v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (11. 1951).
264 Id. at 475-76.
265 Id. at 473-74.
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thought she was suffering from a nervous breakdown and prescribed
tranquilizers."' Massip said she heard voices that told her to "put [her
child] out of his misery" because he was the devil. 6About a month
after his birth, Massip drove over her baby and killed him during a
severe delusion.277 She originally told her husband that the baby had
been kidnapped and provided a description of the kidnapper, but later
admitted at the police station that she had killed their son.278 At trial,
she entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.279
The jury found her guilty of second-degree murder and determined
that Massip was sane at the time she committed the offense.28 Massip
moved for a new trial based upon the sanity findings. 81 The Massip
case garnered much attention when the trial court judge subsequently
reduced the charge to voluntary manslaughter and entered a new find-
ing that Massip was not guilty by reason of insanity.282
California adopted the M'Naghten insanity defense rule by legis-
lation in 1988.283 The jury found Massip guilty and sane under the
M'Naghten rule, because they believed she knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong at the time of the event.2 84 Despite the evi-
dence that Massip was suffering from postpartum psychosis at the
time of the act, the jury still found Massip guilty under the
M'Naghten test.285 While some have argued that postpartum psycho-
sis can satisfy the cognitive aspect of the M'Naghten test because it
can "deprive a defendant of her ability to distinguish right from
wrong at the time of the act, 2 86 others suggest that the M'Naghten
rule poses obstacles for women attempting to use the insanity de-
fense. Those jurisdictions utilizing the M'Naghten rule present these
obstacles because it is always arguable the extent to which a party
would know her action was wrong. 87 The jurisdiction's interpreta-
275 id.
276 Eric Lichtblau, Mother Convicted of Killing Infant Son with Her Car, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1988, at A3.
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tion of the word "knowledge" contained in the M'Naghten rule and
how much psychiatric testimony is allowed within a particular case to
determine the boundaries of this word will therefore largely control
whether a woman with postpartum psychosis reaches the legal defini-
tion of insane in those jurisdictions that utilize the M'Naghten test. 88
In spite of an assertion that individuals suffering from postpartum
psychosis could "fare equally well" under both the ALI and
M'Naghten tests if experts agreed,289 the discrepancies between ver-
dicts for postpartum psychosis cases in state jurisdictions utilizing
different tests suggest otherwise.
The M'Naghten test is too narrow to adequately incorporate
postpartum psychotic women within its bounds.29 Similar to Sheryl
Lynn Massip who was found guilty under an insanity test based upon
the M'Naghten rule, the mother in Clark v. State who wrapped her in-
fant in a blanket and abandoned the child in the desert was found
guilty of murder.29" ' Two psychiatrists and one psychologist testified
that she was suffering from severe postpartum psychosis that made
her legally insane at the time of the offense.292 Despite the testimony
and evidence that Clark was suffering from postpartum psychosis,
she was found guilty under the M'Naghten test, because the jury de-
termined that she could still determine the difference between right
and wrong when she committed the act. 2 11 In this case, the court
adopted the M'Naghten rule and found the defendant guilty.
294
Idaho, however, recognized the inadequacy of the M'Naghten
rule when applied to postpartum depression cases when it adopted the
ALI test in State v. White.295 In White, a woman was changing her
three-month old child when her "mind snapped" and she "threw
[him] on the floor. '296 The baby died later from a skull fracture that
caused a blood clot on the infant's brain.297 Three doctors testified
288 Kimberly Waldron, Postpartum Psychosis As an Insanity Defense: Underneath a
Controversial Defense Lies a Garden Variety Insanity Defense Complicated by Unique Cir-
cumstances for Recognizing Culpability in Causing, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 688 (1990).
289 See Dent, supra note 182.
290 See DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 321.
291 Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979).
292 Id. at 1029.
293 Brenda Barton, Comment, When Murdering Hands Rock the Cradle: An Overview of
America's Incoherent Treatment of Infanticidal Mothers, 51 SMU L. RPEv. 591, 598 (1998).
294 Clark, 588 P.2d at 1029-30.
295 State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (Idaho 1969).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 798.
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regarding the defendant's sanity at the time of the incident. 98 One
expert doctor testified that, at the time of the act, White was "capable
of distinguishing between right and wrong." '299 This same doctor,
however, on cross examination acknowledged that despite her ability
to distinguish between right and wrong, the defendant's throwing her
child on the ground was a "symptom of emotional illness," and she
was therefore not "capable of conforming her conduct to the require-
ments of the law as a result of this illness. 3 °0 Another doctor testi-
fied that at the time of the incident defendant had "neither the capac-
ity to distinguish right from wrong nor the capacity to conform her
conduct to the requirements of the law."3 1 After the jury found the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity based upon the existing
M'Naghten rule, the state appealed to determine the future appropri-
ate guidelines regarding the insanity defense in Idaho.3"2 The court
recognized that, when the M'Naghten rule was established in 1843, it
was based upon other antiquated notions about insanity, including the
wild beast test created in eighteenth century England, and was out of
date and "embodie[d] conclusions about human psychology" that de-
rived from before 1843.303 The Idaho court also recognized that the
M'Naghten rule appeared to be a "product more of political necessity
than of judicial reason. 30 4  The court further criticized the
M'Naghten rule because it was too narrow, since it only questioned
cognitive aspects of a person's decisions and did not consider voli-
tional aspects: "whether the person is able to decide to do or not to do
something and has the capacity to conform to that decision by con-
trolling conduct accordingly.""3 5 Based upon its conclusions regard-
ing the inadequacies of the M'Naghten rule, Idaho adopted the ALI
rule.3"6 Idaho abolished the insanity defense altogether after the
Hinckley acquittal, most likely to remain consistent with the federal
crackdown on the insanity defense." 7 But, the court's reasoning in
298 Id.




303 Id. at 801. See also Arnold's Case, 16 State Trials 695 (1724) (created the "wild
beast test" that considered whether the defendant "doth not know what he is doing no more
than ... a wild beast").
304 White, 456 P.2d at 801.
305 id.
306 Id. at 803.
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State v. White noted how the M'Naghten rule was inadequate in as-
sessing the punishment and insanity of a postpartum psychotic
woman supports the necessity of reforming the insanity defense."'
Andrea Yates faced the death penalty under Texas law based
upon a M'Naghten test of insanity."9 Despite two suicide attempts,
being diagnosed with postpartum psychosis, and being taken off
drugs to regulate her psychosis just two weeks before the killings,
3 10
she received life in prison under the current insanity test in Texas. 1
C. FAILING THE FEMALE OFFENDER: MAINTAINING THE M'NA GHTEN
RULES
The final reason that federal and state jurisdictions should
broaden the insanity defense is because failing to do so perpetuates
the criminal justice system's continual failure to adapt to female of-
fenders. It has been well-documented that gender is one of the most
likely "predictors of crime."3 Studies have indicated, for instance,
that men commit 87.5% of all homicides and most of the violent
felonies while crimes against children are the most "prevalent violent
crime of women." '313 These figures are reflected in other data looking
at specific years. 14 For instance, men constituted eighty-eight per-
cent of those arrested for committing violent crime in 1992.315 Thus,
that the criminal law is essentially, "from top to bottom, preoccupied
with male concerns and male perspectives" is neither surprising nor
"debatable."
316
Feminist theorists have constructed various approaches regard-
ing how female offenders should be incorporated within criminal
308 White, 456 P.2d at 801-04. See supra notes 229-61 and accompanying text.
309 TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31 (Vernon 2000).
310 NPR Morning News (NPR Radio Broadcast, Jan. 7, 2002) (transcript, available at
2002 WL 3186672).
311 Carol Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years, Hous.
CHRON., March 16, 2002, at 1.
312 See Denno, supra note 262, at 80 nI. She cites numerous studies that indicate this
concept, including James W. Messerschmidt, Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Recon-
ceptualiziation of Theory 1 (1993); David F. Greenberg, The Gendering of Crime in Marxist
Theory, in CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 405, 405 (David.
F. Greenberg ed., 1993); Kenneth E. Moyer, Sex Differences in Aggression, in SEX
DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIOR 335, 335 (Richard C. Friedman et al. eds., 1974).
313 SCHWARTZ AND ISSER, supra note 89, at 2.
314 Denno, supra note 262, at 86 n.21(citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 234 tbl. 42 (1992)).
315 Id.
316 See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 2151.
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laws, including an assimilationist, accommodationist, and acceptance
approach.3 17 The assimilationist approach essentially holds that the
criminal law does not need to change to effectively address female
offenders, but rather women must adjust to fit the law.318 Accommo-
dation theory, when applied to the female criminal offender, does ac-
knowledge differences between men and women, but like the assimi-
lationist approach it does "not insist that the male-dominated system
change" instead noting that "special treatment should be established
for the difference in women."3"9 Therefore, under this theory, "spe-
cial" defenses for women would be considered an accommodationist
approach and creating a specific statutory provision for postpartum
psychosis would represent a special accommodation.32 ° The final ac-
ceptance theory is the most flexible and incorporates both male and
female perspectives within the criminal justice system and places
emphasis on the individual criminal defendant and the realities of his
or her life at the center of assessing "criminal culpability., 32' Under
this construction, broadening the insanity defense fits within the ac-
ceptance approach, because it would allow the jury to more accu-
rately assess the individual's mental capacity.3 2
These three theories represent the difficulty in shaping laws that
adjust to and incorporate the female perspective.323 Stephen Shul-
hofer has noted that the real "feminist challenge" in criminal law is to
"adapt male-oriented criminal laws and practices" to address the
needs of "victims and offenders who are normally left out of the pic-
ture. 324
Many have criticized the effort to propound a gender-specific de-
fense based on a postpartum psychosis carve-out exception. For
example, the battered women's defense has been highly criticized for
creating an almost entirely gender-based carve-out. 2 ' Denno asserted
that a "gender-based standard for punishment or defenses would most
likely incorporate gender difference in the prevalence or prediction of




321 See id.; Littleton, supra note 26, at 1306.
322 See infra notes 251-97 and accompanying text.
323 Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 2151.
324 Id.
325 See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text.
326 Denno, supra note 262, at 125.
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crime." '327 There have been attempts at gender-specific defenses for
males, including the xyy chromosome syndrome and high testoster-
one levels.328 While many argue for a "gender neutral" criminal jus-
329tice system, an entirely "gender neutral" criminal justice system is
most likely a figment of imagination because the laws were con-
structed upon a male standard.33 ° Others are wary of recognizing dif-
ferences between male and female criminal offenders because a "dif-
ference" approach potentially "emphasizes differences between men
and women" and thereby treats male and female offenders differ-
ently."' Those who advocate the sameness approach in criminal law
suggest that recognizing differences between genders perpetuates
sexism and negative stereotypes of women.3 2 Indeed, Dorothy Rob-
erts warns that defenses based on women's illnesses "risk misdiag-
nosing the causes of some women's crimes" and that women should
not have to argue that they are insane because the "law does not rec-
ognize the stifling social conditions that contributed to their criminal
acts., 333 Roberts suggests that using postpartum depression defenses
to explain infanticide "reflects society's reluctance to address
women's problems unless they are explained as illnesses. 334 In the
case of infanticide, recent scientific studies have criticized infanticide
statutes such as the English statute that automatically assume that
women who kill their children within one year are mentally ill and
therefore reduce the sentence.335 Dobson and Sales, for example,
concluded (based on an extensive case study that examined the men-
tal illnesses of women in infanticide cases), that all women who
commit infanticide are not necessarily mentally ill.
3 36
V. CONCLUSION
The best way to enable postpartum psychotic women and se-
verely mentally ill individuals to present evidence regarding their
327 Id. at 123.
32 Id. at 126-34.
329 Id. at 160-61.
330 See infra notes 124-36.
331 See Roberts, supra note 26, at 2.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 10-11.
334 Id. at 11.
335 Dobson & Sales, supra note 42, at 1100-02 (citations omitted).
336 Id. at 1102-04 (citations omitted).
20031
JESSIE MANCHESTER
mental history337 is to return to an insanity test based on the American
Law Institute test. 338  Despite incessant criticism of the M'Naghten
insanity test since its creation over 150 years ago in Victorian Eng-
land, the majority of U.S. jurisdictions are still using this less-than-
adequate method.339  The M'Naghten test was based upon a male
standard to address a political crime within an era when women's re-
lationship to the law was remarkably different than it is today.34
The goal of tests promulgated within criminal courts ultimately
is to create a functional remedy and guide that can accurately assess
criminal responsibility and culpability.341 Returning to an insanity
defense test based upon the American Law Institute test that incorpo-
rates a volitional and cognitive prong, will allow juries to consider
the true complexities of mental illness and reflect upon whether
women charged in infanticide cases are truly guilty of murder, and
whether they have formed the requisite intent under traditional homi-
cide statutes.3 42 This country can no longer base its insanity defense
upon a standard that was created in reaction to a political crime in
Victorian England, since criminal laws apply to both male and female
offenders.343 The law must be reformed and shaped to allow female
offenders to adequately assert their defenses.3 44 Redefining the insan-
ity defense would help to remedy the current disparate sentencing
across jurisdictions while avoiding a statutory construction that
would apply only to women.3 45 Although a separate infanticide stat-
ute could be beneficial (in the sense that it recognizes a postpartum
psychosis as a legitimate condition that could provide an explanation
for why women would commit infanticide), 346 a universal infanticide
337 See DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 322.
338 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
339 See infra notes 164-226 and accompanying text.
340 See infra notes 240-256 and accompanying text.
341 See DRESSLER, supra note 176, at 300, for a general discussion of penological theory.
It is "morally obtuse to punish a person for committing an act if her internal capacity to con-
trol herself was severely undermined by mental illness." Id.
342 See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
343 See infra notes 295-324 and accompanying text.
344 See Reece, supra note 13, at 754-57.
345 See infra notes 295-324 and accompanying text for a discussion of problems of a
gender specific carve-out statute.
346 See Tricia L. Schroeder, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis as Defensefor Murder, 21
W. ST. U. L. REV. 267, 293 (1993). Schroeder urges the medical community to recognize




statute would make broad assumptions about women and mental ill-
ness and is reminiscent of theories regarding women's defective men-
tal state articulated during the Victorian era.34
Finally, the media attention surrounding the Andrea Yates case
again suggests how crucial it is that postpartum depression is detected
and prevented before any woman resorts to infanticide. 348 Although a
statutory remedy that automatically reduces criminal charges in in-
fanticide cases is not the best method for treating cases where women
kill their children, there are some statutory steps that could occur on
the state and federal level to prevent further infanticide cases. 349 For
example, Congress is currently considering the Melanie Stokes Post-
partum Depression Research and Care Act that would create a plan
for managing postpartum depression and for screening.350 Although
legislation is wrought with obstacles (such as determining which
agency would screen postpartum depression cases) legislation could
force American society to recognize postpartum depression.351
Most importantly, women like Andrea Yates (who once lived in
a Greyhound bus with her husband and three children-her fourth
child born later-while also caring for her father with Alzheimer's)
need community support. 352 An editorial from a San Antonio, Texas
newspaper written before the jury deliberated Yates' fate noted that,
if there is blame for the death of the Yates children, it should be
"borne by many, including Yates' husband; the friends and family
who failed to get her help; and the mental health system itself.
' 353
"The medical community will be on its way to finding answers to the postpartum question when
it realizes that the postpartum period is unique and must be treated as such .... Once these dis-
orders are recognized as unique problems unlike any others, women will be able to seek out and
get help before it is too late."
Id.
347 See Cate Hemingway, Boxing Women: Regulation, Women and Mental Health, 2
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 109, 127 (1995).
348 For a discussion on the importance of prevention and detection of postpartum depres-
sion, see MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 20, at 168-77.
349 Jennifer Huget, Postpartum Depression: No Easy Answers, WASHINGTON POST, Jan.
22, 2002, at 1.
350 Id.
351 ld.
352 See Roche, supra note 3, at 46.
353 Execution Wrong Sentence for Yates, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss NEWS, Jan. 15, 2002, at
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Jurors took only three and a half hours to reject Yates' insanity
defense and find her guilty of murder.3 "4 Although jurors sentenced
her to life in prison and not to the death penalty, the jury's decision
stemmed from their consideration of psychiatric testimony addressing
whether or not Yates knew her actions were wrong. 5 Yates' convic-
tion, despite her extensive psychotic mental history, makes the need
for insanity defense reform urgent.356 Otherwise, the law will con-
tinue to force women suffering from postpartum psychosis to shape
their defenses around archaic standards and will perpetuate the crimi-
nal justice system's neglect of female offenders.
354 Carol Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Found Guilty: Jury Takes 3 2 Hours to Con-
vict Mother in Children's Deaths, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at Al.
355 Id.
356 Texas Legislator Garnet Coleman plans to introduce a bill in the next Texas legisla-
tive session that would reform the Texas insanity defense statute. See Mike Tolson & Todd
Ackerman, Jury Gives Yates Life Term With No Parolefor 40 Years; A Catalyst for Change
in Law on Insanity, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2002, at 1.
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